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The Battle of Tassafarong

mazzeltof 16.07.14 в 18:51

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Hello dear readers. Battle of Guadalcanal brought us a bunch of all types of naval battles. For every taste, from the attacks of fast torpedo boats to battleships skirmishes. Today I will tell you about one of the finest. In this battle, was the hero of this issue USS "Pensacola". The battle took place 30 November 1942. But we will start from a little background.

mazzeltof 16.07.14 в 19:06

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1942 - Empire of Japan, despite the heavy defeat at Midway, is full of power and extends its expansion into the Pacific Ocean to the Solomon Islands. The purpose of capturing the island of Guadalcanal was to build the airfield and the base, cutting communications between the allies: U.S., Australia and New Zealand. To protect their seaways, as well as to gain a foothold for further offense against Rabul allies were also interested in the island. To establish control over it they undertake a landing operation . The Japanese were not expecting this, and their intelligence hasn't had any information due to the weather conditions. American troops surpass the Japanese in the numbers, besides Japanese have had very few of real troops, mostly they were builders. The landing was successfull, resulting in capturing "Henderson Field" airfield and establishing a defensive perimeter around it. Japan does not want to give up this strategically important position and pulled extra forces.A battle for this airfield will unfold from August 1942 to February 1943. During this battle will happen several major fights - 3 on Land and 5 on sea.

mazzeltof 16.07.14 в 19:06

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The Background of battle.

mazzeltof 16.07.14 в 19:06

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Capturing of the airfield provided the Allies with oppotunity to bomb the enemy's communications, for the Japanese on the islands fell on hard times. It was impossible to conduct large trsansports - with troops, heavy weapons, and most importantly with the supplies. All Attempts to situate new airfields on the central island have failed, and the supplys from submarines were not enough. Some logistical detachments have not been getting food for 6 days, and the troops on the frontlines only get a third of the rations. However a solution was found soon - the cargo starts beiing delivered at night, using fast ships (mostly destroyers , many of which have been converted into high-speed transports). Usually due to the need of rapid return, destroyers did not have time for unloading operations, so many of the goods were simly dumped into the water in sealed steel containers tied together with slings. Then floating container are washed ashore, or they were caught out of water from the barges; loads often lost. So thats how a "Tokyo Express" was born (this name was given to fast night transports by allied amss media, the Japanese themselves called them "Rat Transportation" Jap. 鼠 输送 nedzumi yuso).

mazzeltof 16.07.14 в 20:11

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Before the battle

mazzeltof 16.07.14 в 20:49

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The battle of Tassafarong was the battle of "Tokyo Express" (8 destroyers: Naganami (flagship), Takanami, transport group without reserve torpedoes - Kuroshio, Oyashio, Kagero, Suzukaze, Kawakaze and Makinami) from one side and TF 67 (4 heavy cruisers (Minneapolis, New-Orleans, Pensacola, Northhampton), 1 light cruiser (Honololu), 6 destroyers (Fletcher, Drayton, Maury, Perkins, Lamson, Lardner) from the other side. The commander of Japanese formation was Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka (27 of April 1892 - 9 of July 1969), the expert in torpedoes and destroyers. The TF 67 was formed after Allies were defeated in the first battle for Guadalcanal. Formation contained 3 groups: 2 of them were cruisers, one - destroyers, each one had a ship equipped with radio-location set SG. American forces were commanded by Rear Admiral Carleton H. Wright (2 of June 1892 - 27 of June 1970), he has been appointed commander of TF 67 actually on the eve of the battle. After taking command, Wright сonsulted with ship commanders about the plan of the battle with Japanese ships in future, including night battles of Guadalcanal. Plan, which was already developped by Kinkade, supposed that destroyers, equipped with radars go in advance of cruisers and attack Japanese ships with torpedoes immediately after their reveailing and than quit battlefield, leaving the cruisers clear place for gunnery. The cruiser should start artillery fire at the range from 9.144 to 10.972 meters.. Seaplanes were supposed to provide aerial reconnaisance and dropping star shells over the enemy during the battle

GenrichGoldring 17.07.14 в 07:10

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взял

mazzeltof 16.07.14 в 20:50

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The 29 of November Allies' intelligence caught and decrypted Japanese message which was given to 17-th army at Guadalcanal, which was warning about terms of coming of Tanaka's detachment. After Halsey was given this information, he ordered Wright to intercept of Tanaka near Guadalcanal. Formation TF 67 where Wright's flagship became Minneapolis, left Espírito Santo on the speed of 27 knots (50 km/h) immediately after midnight of 29-th of November and sailed for 580 miles (1075 km) to Guadalcanal. While sailing, destroyers Lamson and Lardner were encountered, which were returning after escorting of convoy to Guadalcanal. They were directed to join TF 67. Feeling lack of time for dedicating commanders of encouterned destroyers in plan of the battle, Wright ordered them to take the place in column after cruisers

GenrichGoldring 17.07.14 в 07:10

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On November 29, Allied intelligence personnel intercepted and decoded a Japanese message transmitted to the 17th Army on Guadalcanal alerting them to Tanaka's supply run. Informed of the message, Halsey ordered Wright to take TF67 to intercept Tanaka off Guadalcanal. TF67, with Wright flying his flag on Minneapolis, departed Espiritu Santo at 27 knots (50 km/h) just before midnight on November 29 for the 580 miles (930 km) run to Guadalcanal. En route, destroyers Lamson and Lardner, returning from a convoy escort assignment to Guadalcanal, were ordered to join up with TF67. Lacking the time to brief the commanding officers of the joining destroyers of his battle plan, Wright assigned them a position behind the cruisers.

GenrichGoldring 20.07.14 в 08:24

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взял

mazzeltof 16.07.14 в 20:50

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Tanaka's force departed the Shortlands just after midnight on November 30 for the run to Guadalcanal. Tanaka attempted to evade Allied aerial reconnaissance aircraft by first heading northeast through Bougainville Strait before turning southeast and then south to pass through Indispensable Strait. Paul Mason, an Australian coastwatcher stationed in southern Bougainville, reported by radio the departure of Tanaka's ships from Shortland and this message was passed to Wright. At the same time, a Japanese search aircraft spotted an Allied convoy near Guadalcanal and communicated the sighting to Tanaka who told his destroyer commanders to expect action that night and that, "In such an event, utmost efforts will be made to destroy the enemy without regard for the unloading of supplies."

GenrichGoldring 17.07.14 в 07:10

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The Battle

mazzeltof 17.07.14 в 07:03

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Vanguard group of formation (at that time right flank) was formed of destroyers Fletcher (broad pennant of commander of TG 67.4 (he is also a commader of Fletcher) William Cole), Perkins, Maury, Drayton. Than one after another were cruisers: Minneapolis (Wright's flag), New-Orleans, Pensacola, Honololu, (flag of Rear Admiral Malon Teasdale) and Northampton. Leftflanking Lamson and Lardner were bringing up the rear.

GenrichGoldring 20.07.14 в 09:48

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At 23:06 strange impulse on the screen of radio-locator of cruiser Minneapolis has appeared - target was 11 miles dead ahead. Wright immediately ordered to turn right and the task force formed the line of battle again. (Отвернув несколько влево, американские корабли легли на курс почти параллельный курсу кораблей Танаки.) At the same time, Tanaka's ships, which were not equipped with radar, split into two groups and prepared to shove the drums overboard. Naganami, Kawakaze, and Suzukaze headed for their drop-off point near Doma Reef while Makinami, Kagero, Oyashio, and Kurashio aimed for nearby Tassafaronga. At 23:12, Takanami's crew visually sighted Wright's column, quickly confirmed by lookouts on Tanaka's other ships.

То, что в скобках будет переведено позже

GenrichGoldring 17.07.14 в 07:10

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American vanguard's destroyer, which by that time have also located the enemy, began preparing to torpedo attack. Fletcher was going ahead and was keeping a continuous radio-locating look-out. By 23:16 targets were on the port bow from him on the range of 35 cables length. Commander of TG 67.4 Cole requested about permision to make torpedo salvo. By-turn, Wright precised if the range torpedo shooting isn't very big. After receiving an answer american admiral needed 4 minutes more to allow an attack. When he gave the permision for a torpedo attack, the US destroyer's targets escaped from an optimum firing setup ahead to a marginal position passing abeam, giving the American torpedoes a long overtaking run near the limit of their range. At 23:20, Fletcher, Perkins, and Drayton fired a total of 20 torpedoes towards Tanaka's ships. Maury, lacking SG radar and thus having no contacts, withheld fire

GenrichGoldring 17.07.14 в 07:10

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Evidently, this hold-up became fateful for americans. Their ships which сarelessly сame closer to the enemy, become noticeable with unaided eye. At 23:12, even before Fletcher and Minneapolis began their throughtful talks, Takanami's signalmen reported about detection of "7 american destroyers" which were coming from the opposite direction. First Tanaka's reaction was immediate retreat after container dropping but soon, after good sizing up the situation he ordered to approach and decidedly attack. Only 2 bringing up destroyers from 24-th division at 23:16 took order to separate and drop containers. A bit later flagship Naganami also separated from main forces

GenrichGoldring 20.07.14 в 15:17

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At the same time, Wright ordered his force to open fire. At 23:21, Minneapolis complied with her first salvo, quickly followed by the other American cruisers. Cole's four destroyers fired star shells to illuminate the targets as previously directed then increased speed to clear the area for the cruisers to operate. Takanami, which was situated closer than others to the enemy, was already hit by first salvos. He continued energetically manoeuvring under squall of fire, but heavy 8-inch shells were catching him again and again. Frigate captain Masami Ogura and commander of division of destroyers frigate captain Tasio Simidzi died on the battle stations. 10 minutes later Takanami was set afire and incapacitated. Nevertheless, he succeed in engrossing enemy gunners' attention. Reports about sinking new and new Japanese destroyers were pouring in to Wright, who lost his head because of such luck.

GenrichGoldring 20.07.14 в 09:30

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However, the most dreadful trials for americans were ahead. Exactly in this minutes Tanaka ordered his destroyers' commanders directing his attention on the explodes on Minneapolis and New Orleans, let the bulk of torpedoes to go

GenrichGoldring 29.07.14 в 15:03

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Pensacola's participation in the Battle of Tassafarong

GenrichGoldring 31.07.14 в 16:47

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In the battle Pensacola's commander was captain Frank L. Low

GenrichGoldring 31.07.14 в 16:48

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Сonclusions

GenrichGoldring 21.07.14 в 15:25

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The battle was one of the worst defeats suffered by the US Navy in World War II, third only to the Attack on Pearl Harbor and the Battle of Savo Island. The battle, along with the losses suffered during the Battle of Savo Island, Cape Esperance and the Naval Battles of Guadalcanal temporarily left the US Navy with only 4 operational heavy cruisers and 9 light cruisers in the entire Pacific Ocean. In spite of his defeat in the battle, Wright was awarded the Navy Cross, one of the highest American military decorations for bravery, for his actions during the engagement. Mitigating to some degree the destruction of his task force, Wright, in his after-action report, claimed that his force sank four Japanese destroyers and damaged two others. Halsey, in his comments on Wright's report, placed much of the blame for the defeat on Cole, saying that the destroyer squadron commander fired his torpedoes from too great a distance to be effective and should have "helped" the cruisers instead of circling around Savo Island. Russell Sydnor Crenshaw Jr. (by the way, he isn't only the historian but also participator in the battle in the capacity of artillery officer of destroyer Maury) thinks that the part of the fault lies on the Rear Admiral Teasdale, who took command after the flagsip's defeat. He commanded only nominally (all signs of losing of the command present), in fact, he wanted to save himself on undamaged cruiser Honololu

GenrichGoldring 21.07.14 в 15:23

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What about Japanese? Tanaka claimed to have sunk a battleship and two cruisers in the battle. Later Rear Admiral Tanaka continued commanding of supply of Guadalcanal. Voyages of "Tokyo Experess" were very dangerous. The last attempt to deliver food to Guadalcanal by destroyers in 1942 was led by Tanaka on the night of December 11 and consisted of 11 destroyers. Five US PT boats met Tanaka off Guadalcanal and torpedoed his flagship Teruzuki, severely damaging the destroyer and injuring Tanaka. After Tanaka transferred to Naganami, Teruzuki was scuttled. Only 220 of the 1,200 drums released that night were recovered by Japanese army personnel on shore. Tanaka was subsequently relieved of command and transferred to Japan on December 29, 1942.

GenrichGoldring 21.07.14 в 15:30

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The results of the battle led to further discussion in the US Pacific Fleet about changes in tactical doctrine and the need for technical improvements, such as flashless powder. It was not until eight months later that the naval high command recognized there were serious problems with the functioning of the torpedoes. The Americans were still unaware of the range and power of Japanese torpedoes and the effectiveness of Japanese night battle tactics. In fact, Wright claimed that his ships must have been fired on by submarines since the observed position of Tanaka's ships "make it improbable that torpedoes with speed-distance characteristics similar to our own" could have caused such damage, though Tanaka states that his torpedoes were fired at a range as short as three miles. The Americans would not recognize the true capabilities of their Pacific adversary's torpedoes and night tactics until well into 1943. After the war, Tanaka said of his victory at Tassafaronga, "I have heard that US naval experts praised my command in that action. I am not deserving of such honors. It was the superb proficiency and devotion of the men who served me that produced the tactical victory for us."

GenrichGoldring 21.07.14 в 15:08

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References

GenrichGoldring 17.07.14 в 07:14

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1. http://militera.lib.ru/h/morozov_granov ... index.html

GenrichGoldring 17.07.14 в 07:13

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2. Morison, Struggle for Guadalcanal

GenrichGoldring 17.07.14 в 07:12

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3. Griffith, Battle for Guadalcanal

GenrichGoldring 17.07.14 в 07:12

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4. Crenshaw Jr., Russell S., The Battle of Tassafaronga

GenrichGoldring 17.07.14 в 07:12

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5. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Tassafaronga

GenrichGoldring 17.07.14 в 07:12

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6. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Raizo_Tanaka

GenrichGoldring 17.07.14 в 07:11

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7. http://www.combinedfleet.com/lancers.htm

GenrichGoldring 17.07.14 в 07:11

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